College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

2015

Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of
Interstate Commerce: An Essay for Herbert
Hovenkamp
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School, ajmees@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Meese, Alan J., "Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An Essay for Herbert Hovenkamp" (2015). Faculty
Publications. 1782.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1782

Copyright c 2015 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

A12_MEESE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/18/2015 12:32 PM

Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints
of Interstate Commerce: An Essay for
Professor Hovenkamp
Alan J. Meese
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 2161
II. THE STATUS OF STATE-IMPOSED RESTRAINTS UNDER THE SHERMAN
ACT ............................................................................................. 2163
III. DUAL FEDERALISM AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT IN 1890 ........... 2168
IV. THE FALL OF DUAL FEDERALISM AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT ... 2182
V. APPLYING THE SHERMAN ACT TO STATE RESTRAINTS IN A
POST-1937 WORLD ..................................................................... 2186
VI. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 2194
I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Hovenkamp has made important and insightful contributions
to the literature on antitrust federalism, antitrust history, and the influence of
evolving theories of political economy on antitrust doctrine and constitutional
law. This Essay builds upon these contributions, particularly as they relate to
the appropriate federal antitrust response to state regulation that
unreasonably restrains interstate commerce. Under modern constitutional
law, states may restrain interstate commerce by imposing restrictions on price
or banning reasonable, wealth-creating restraints. Congress could preempt
such restraints, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Sherman
Act does not nullify such legislative interference with free competition. The
Court has justified these results by invoking considerations of “federalism”
and “state sovereignty.” Thus, the Court has imputed to Congress a refusal to
exercise the full scope of its commerce power out of deference to state
regulatory prerogatives.


Ball Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor, William and Mary Law School.
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As Professor Hovenkamp has explained, however, such congressional
intent is entirely fictional. During the 1890s, the constitutional regime of
“dual federalism” enforced by judicial interpretations of the Commerce
Clause prevented the overlap between federal and state regulation that makes
preemption possible. This Essay elaborates upon this (correct) conclusion,
clarifying the nature of dual federalism during antitrust’s formative era. The
Essay also suggests that due process protection for liberty of contract
prevented states from banning reasonable private restraints of intrastate
commerce, restraints that facilitated the operation of interstate markets. The
Congress that passed the Sherman Act would have assumed that states had no
authority to regulate commerce subject to the Sherman Act or reasonable
intrastate restraints beyond the scope of Congress’s power.
Of course, the constitutional framework in place during antitrust’s
formative era collapsed in 1937, when the Supreme Court abandoned liberty
of contract and ceased placing meaningful limits on Congress’s commerce
power. At the same time (and this is less well-known), the Court “unshackled”
the states, weakening the Dormant Commerce Clause and allowing states to
impose restraints on interstate commerce that pre-1937 case law would have
condemned.
The simultaneous expansion of Congress’s commerce power and
relaxation of Dormant Commerce Clause standards created overlapping
regulatory authority and thus opened the door to Sherman Act preemption
of state restraints. Professor Hovenkamp has signaled openness to such
preemption, at least where state restraints produce interstate spillovers. This
Essay briefly reviews the strong case for such preemption as well as the
counterarguments against it. The Essay also offers an alternative approach
that would void restraints that produce meaningful spillovers, avoid Sherman
Act preemption of much state law, and eliminate much of the overlap between
state and federal jurisdiction that gives rise to the federalism concerns that
preemption opponents invoke.
Part II of this Essay reviews modern doctrines governing the Sherman
Act’s treatment of state-imposed restraints. Part III discusses the constitutional
landscape that Congress faced when it passed the Sherman Act in 1890,
particularly dual federalism and liberty of contract. This Part also examines
how these principles informed antitrust doctrine during antitrust’s formative
era. Part IV details the collapse of this constitutional regime during the 1930s.
Part V frames the interpretive questions posed by this collapse and articulates
the competing arguments for and against Sherman Act preemption. This Part
then offers an alternative approach that would nullify state restraints that
produce significant spillovers, while minimizing federalism concerns.
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II. THE STATUS OF STATE-IMPOSED RESTRAINTS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
The Sherman Act forbids contracts and other arrangements that
unreasonably restrain “trade or commerce among the several [s]tates.”1 The
classic example is a railroad cartel that charges non-competitive rates for the
interstate transportation of goods or passengers.2 What, though, if states
themselves interfere with free competition and restrain trade? Such
interference can take three forms. First, states can authorize private parties to
engage in anticompetitive conduct themselves by, for example, legalizing
horizontal price fixing or mergers that result in monopoly.3 Second, states can
compel private parties to restrain trade, by, for instance, requiring firms to
charge prices above the competitive level. Third, states can ban conduct
within interstate commerce that federal courts have previously determined to
be reasonable and thus lawful under the Sherman Act. A contemporary
example of this third category is state bans on minimum resale-price
maintenance (“rpm”), despite the Supreme Court’s holding that the practice
often creates wealth and is analyzed under the Rule of Reason.4
The Sherman Act condemns restraints in the first category, despite
ostensible state approval, unless the state “actively supervises” the resulting
prices or other conduct.5 In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court evaluated the
second type of restraint: California’s coercive restriction on farmers’ raisin
output.6 Over 90% of the state’s raisin crop was exported from the state, and
a private cartel producing the same result would have violated the Sherman
Act.7 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Sherman
Act does not preempt such legislation, rejecting the contrary argument by the

1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
3. Cf. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332–33 (1904) (rejecting an argument
that state-law validity of a merger immunized a transaction from Sherman Act attack).
4. Compare Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–92, 899
(2007) (rejecting a per se rule banning minimum rpm because the practice often produces
competitive benefits), with California v. Bioelements, Inc., No. 10011659 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 11,
2011), available at http://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/n2028_bioelements
_final_judgment.pdf (issuing a consent decree banning minimum rpm under state law). State statutes
authorizing indirect purchaser suits to enforce state antitrust laws provide another example. See
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 817
(4th ed. 2010) (characterizing these statutes as “[t]he most difficult preemption challenge facing
state antitrust in recent years”).
5. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (condemning
state-authorized price fixing where states did not “actively supervise” resulting prices). Where
states do “actively supervise” pricing, the Court treats the resulting prices as though the state itself
imposed them. Id. at 634–35. In such cases, the restraint in question falls into the second category
discussed in the text.
6. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 344 (1943).
7. Id. at 345, 350 (assuming such restrictions “would violate the Sherman Act if [they] were
organized and made effective solely by virtue of a [private] contract”).
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United States, as amicus curiae.8 Invoking the Constitution’s “dual system,” in
which states are “sovereign,” the Court declined to impute to Congress an
intent to ban the restraint, which “derived its authority and its efficacy from
the legislative command of the state and was not intended to operate or
become effective without that command,” even though that “command”
restrained interstate commerce as much as analogous and illegal private
conduct.9 Nearly five decades later, the Court reiterated that Parker rested
upon: “principles of federalism and state sovereignty,” and held that the
Sherman Act did not ban anticompetitive restraints imposed “as an act of
government.”10
Subsequently the Court applied similar logic to the third category of
state-imposed restraints, namely, bans on private wealth-creating conduct.11
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, the Court rejected antitrust preemption
of Maryland’s ban on vertical integration and procompetitive price
discrimination by gasoline refiners, both of which were lawful under federal
antitrust law.12 The Court conceded that the bans had an “anticompetitive
effect” and interfered with “economic liberty,” the latter of which, the Court
said, was the central policy of the Sherman Act.13 Nonetheless, the Court
opined that antitrust preemption would “effectively destroy” states’ ability to
regulate economic activity.14 In so holding, the Court implicitly equated
“regulation” with coercive interference with wealth-creating activity.
In California v. ARC America, the Court rejected Sherman Act preemption
of state antitrust regulation, namely, a provision allowing indirect purchasers
to recover damages from state antitrust violations.15 The Court emphasized

8. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 91, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943) (No. 46), 1942 WL 54242; HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 796 (discussing the relationship
between preemption and the state action doctrine articulated in Parker).
9. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (“In a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is
not lightly to be attributed to Congress.”); see also id. at 350–51 (assuming that Congress may
preempt such state restrictions).
10. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991); see also id.
(“Parker emphasized the role of sovereign States in a federal system.”).
11. See generally Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and
ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 29 (2000) (persuasively equating state-imposed restraints
and state bans on conduct lawful under the Sherman Act).
12. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133–34 (1978).
13. Id. at 133.
14. Id. (“[I]f an adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state
statute invalid, the States’ power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed.”).
15. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105–06 (1989).
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that state antitrust laws predated the Sherman Act; Congress was aware of
these laws but did not mean to displace them when it passed the Act.16
There appears to be a scholarly consensus that Parker, Exxon, and ARC
America were correctly decided. Professor Hovenkamp, for instance, has
asserted that: “nothing in the federal antitrust laws even hints that Congress
intended to preempt state and local economic law simply because that law
interferes with competitive markets.”17 Other scholars agree that courts
should read the Sherman Act in light of federalism considerations, imputing
to the 51st Congress a preference for federalism over national policy favoring
free interstate markets.18 With rare exception, these scholars (properly) agree
with Professor Hovenkamp that Congress could preempt state-imposed cartels
restraining interstate commerce.19 Nonetheless, they agree that Congress did
not choose to do so.
There is similar agreement that the Sherman Act does not preempt state
regulation, including antitrust regulation, banning conduct deemed
reasonable under the Sherman Act. Here again Professor Hovenkamp is in
the vanguard, asserting that: “the legislative history of the Sherman Act is
replete with statements that the Act was designed to supplement rather than
to abrogate existing state antitrust enforcement.”20 Other scholars agree,
invoking the same federalism considerations that supposedly convinced
Congress not to preempt state-imposed cartels.21
16. Id. at 101 & n.4. But see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284–85 (1972) (invoking the
Sherman Act and the Dormant Commerce Clause as preempting state antitrust regulation of
baseball’s reserve system).
17. HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 793; see id. at 797 (“But no one has ever made a serious
argument that Congress intended to use the Sherman Act to displace all forms of state and local
regulation of prices and entry.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 40–41 (1983) (finding no indication that Congress believed the
Sherman Act would preempt state legislation).
18. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 11, at 41; William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the
Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum,
61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1136–37 (1981).
19. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 793 (“[T]he federal government undoubtedly has the
power to preempt much . . . state and local regulation.”). Contrary to the views of one scholar,
modern Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence would not prevent Congress from preempting state
restraints. See Burns, supra note 11, at 38–39. But see Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535
U.S. 635, 648 (2002) (authorizing suit against state officials seeking injunctive relief against state
regulation purportedly preempted by federal law). See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
20. Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 378 (1983)
(finding that no member of Congress expressed an intent to preempt state law); see also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 815–16 (stating, with apparent approval, that “[t]he Supreme Court
has consistently held that nothing in the federal antitrust laws or any other body of federal law
indicates that Congress intended to displace state antitrust law”). But see HOVENKAMP, supra note
4, at 816 (identifying rare instances in which preemption might be appropriate).
21. Burns, supra note 11, at 30–31 (citing HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 723 (2nd ed. 1999)) (contending that
Parker’s rationale justifies distinct state antitrust regulation “insofar as those laws do not require a
violation of federal law”).

A12_MEESE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2166

6/18/2015 12:32 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:2161

It seems that some antitrust scholars would prefer a different result,
however. Professor Hovenkamp, for instance, has explained that state
restraints can both enrich local producers and also create interstate spillovers
that harm consumers located in other states.22 The Parker case, he explains,
provides an example: local raisin producers reaped the benefits of the
restraint, while out-of-state consumers paid higher prices and purchased
reduced output.23 As Professor Hovenkamp has said, the principle of
federalism, properly understood, does not countenance state legislation
enriching in-state producers at the expense of out-of-state consumers.24 Thus,
despite his belief that Parker accurately ascertained congressional intent,
Professor Hovenkamp seems open to some limitation of the state-action
doctrine that accounts for such spillovers.25 This endorsement seems
unenthusiastic, however. For, in addition to opining that Parker was correctly
decided, Professor Hovenkamp has questioned the workability of a stateaction immunity analysis that accounts for interstate spillovers, given that so
many state-imposed restraints have some impact, no matter how small, on outof-state consumers.26 He also suggests that state-imposed restraints that
produce “overwhelming” spillovers would likely offend Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.27
Like Professor Hovenkamp, I too am uncomfortable with the Parker,
Exxon, and ARC America trio. As others have noted, Parker arose when serious
people believed that state-enforced cartelization or monopolization could

22. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 627, 643–45
(2006) (describing the problem of interstate spillovers in a regime that allows local regulation of
interstate commerce); id. at 640 (“[C]ourts must develop a coherent doctrine with which to
address spillovers.”); see also Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation
and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719, 770–71 (1985).
23. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 367 (1943) (“The program . . . undoubtedly affected
the [interstate] commerce by increasing the interstate price of raisins and curtailing interstate
shipments to some undetermined extent.”); Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 22, at 769
(“[A]lthough all the beneficiaries of the regulation were within the jurisdiction of the regulating
sovereign, almost all of its victims, those forced to pay a higher price because of the restrictions
on output, were located outside. The statute effectively legalized a cartel of California raisin
growers selling their raisins to customers located outside California.”).
24. Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 644 (“It is one thing to approve an anticompetitive state
regulatory scheme when the burden falls substantially on that state’s own residents. But
federalism does not require federal authority to permit states to export anticompetitive
regulatory schemes. Under the current formulation of the state action exemption, extraterritorial
impact of state regulatory schemes is not even regarded as relevant.”).
25. Id. at 640 (“[C]ourts must develop a coherent doctrine with which to address
spillovers.”); id. at 645 (“A coherent doctrine of spillovers and its inclusion as a state action
immunity requirement will therefore require some new directions in case development.”).
26. Id. at 645–47.
27. Id. at 646 (“[O]ne can imagine egregious situations in which the impact of state
regulation falls almost entirely on out-of-state interests, but then it seems the [D]ormant
Commerce Clause would be sufficient to handle the problem.” (citations omitted)).
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help stabilize the macro economy—a claim that only politicians make today.28
All three decisions countenance some regulation by political entities that do
not internalize the full costs of their actions.29 The predictable result will be
too many state-imposed restraints and too much state antitrust regulation.
Such overregulation, of course, will distort the allocation of resources and
reduce national wealth. Moreover, to the extent that such regulation reduces
price flexibility, Parker and its progeny interfere with the process of natural
economic adjustment and thus exacerbate recessions.30 Far from destroying
the ability of states to engage in regulation, reversal of such decisions would
simply confine states to “reasonable” regulation, just as the Sherman Act
confines private parties to reasonable restraints of trade.31 Federal
preemption of state-imposed cartels, for instance, would leave states perfectly
free to combat externalities, produce public goods, and redistribute income
via taxing and spending.32
28. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (describing contemporary arguments that too much competition brought on the
Depression and that state control of production was the appropriate remedy); John T. Delacourt
& Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on the Proper Role of Government, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 1075, 1077 (2005) (noting that Parker reflected a “mindset . . . extremely skeptical
of markets, favoring instead government industrial policy”); see also Alan J. Meese, Competition
Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and a New Way Forward, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
255, 320–23 (2013) (describing arguments by proponents of the NIRA—including the United
States—and other forms of state-sanctioned cartelization that such regulation would raise wages,
enhance “purchasing power” and thus stimulate the macroeconomy); id. at 313 (describing
California’s contention in Parker that the plight of the state’s raisin growers was worse than that
of Depression-era coal and milk industries).
29. I do not mean to suggest that every state-imposed restraint that Congress could preempt
under modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence imposes costs on citizens in other states. Given
the Supreme Court’s refusal to enforce meaningful limits on the commerce power, many stateimposed restraints that Congress could preempt under current law have little if any impact on
other states. For instance, state-imposed restraints that create barriers to entry into the
occupation of teeth whitening, while obviously anticompetitive, do not injure out-of-state
consumers. Cf. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015)
(holding that state board of dental examiners had committed unfair trade practice by conspiring
to exclude rivals from intrastate market for teeth whitening). Thus, under the original
conception of the commerce power, such restraints would exceed the authority of Congress. See
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (opining that commerce power does not
empower Congress to regulate “those [activities] which are completely within a particular State,
which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose
of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce
of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself”). But cf. Hovenkamp, supra
note 22, at 645–46 (“[E]very state and local regulation has some spillover. For example, out-ofstate visitors may have to use the trash disposal, taxicab, hospital, or ambulance services that are
subject to a challenged restraint.” (citations omitted)).
30. See infra notes 192–96 and accompanying text.
31. Cf. George W. Wickersham, The Police Power, A Product of the Rule of Reason, 27 HARV. L.
REV. 297, 297–98 (1914) (invoking Standard Oil ’s Rule of Reason as exemplifying appropriate
method for discerning whether legislation falls within the police power).
32. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 8, at 63–64 (contending that
restraint evaluated in Parker violated the Sherman Act, but that “Congress . . . did not intend to
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At the same time, I, like Professor Hovenkamp, must take care lest I
expand the scope of the Sherman Act beyond its original meaning,
improperly using the Act as a license to void state legislation I deem
counterproductive. The remainder of this Essay will examine that original
meaning with respect to state-imposed restraints in the second and third
categories outlined above, drawing upon the important work Professor
Hovenkamp has already done. We will see that Professor Hovenkamp is
absolutely correct that Congress did not subjectively intend to ban stateimposed restraints when it passed the Sherman Act. Thus, it initially appears
that Sherman Act preemption must depend upon a particularly dynamic
approach to reading statutes, an approach that likely exceeds the authority of
the courts. He is also correct, however, that Parker’s “correct” conclusion rests
upon a “fictional reading of the legislative history of the antitrust laws.” Simply
put, the constitutional landscape extant when Congress passed the Sherman
Act excluded the overlapping regulatory authority that gives rise to the
possibility of preemption.33 That landscape also included meaningful limits
on the scope of federal power as well as Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
that was more interventionist than that found in modern Supreme Court case
law, including Parker itself. That doctrine would have preempted state
restraints of interstate commerce producing interstate spillovers and thus
voided Parker-type restraints. The same doctrine also preempted state
regulation of private restraints of interstate commerce. Finally, due process
protection for liberty of contract precluded states from banning many
indirect restraints of interstate or intrastate commerce.
III. DUAL FEDERALISM AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT IN 1890
As explained previously, courts and scholars agree that Congress did not
intend the Sherman Act to preempt state restraints. At one level, this
consensus is irrefutable, at least if one equates “intent” with “knowledge.”
Congress “knew” that the Sherman Act would not displace state regulation,
no matter how injurious to interstate commerce. Thus, Congress did not
“intend” to displace such state-imposed restraints. At the same time,
Congress’s subjective understanding of how the Sherman Act would operate
has nothing to do with the actual question posed in Parker, for instance. To
understand why, we must reconstruct the source of this subjective
understanding, again drawing upon and supplementing work Professor
Hovenkamp has already done.

deprive the states of their normal ‘police’ powers over business and industry” (footnote omitted));
see also infra notes 108–12 and accompanying text (discussing scope of the police power during the
Lochner era). For instance, Sherman Act preemption of the Parker restraints would not prevent
California from taxing its own citizens and showering the proceeds on its raisin producers.
33. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 797 (“The ‘state action’ doctrine itself rests on a
fictional reading of the legislative history of the antitrust laws.”).
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Simply put, the 51st Congress would have assumed that the Constitution
obviated possible conflicts between federal antitrust law and state restraints.
As understood at the time, the “dual sovereignty” that Parker and its modern
proponents invoke actually precluded such a conflict. For one thing, Congress
lacked authority to regulate intrastate commerce, thus leaving states with
exclusive authority over a substantial portion of economic conduct (subject
of course to the 14th Amendment and the Contracts Clause, for instance). At
the same time, what power Congress did possess was generally exclusive
(subject to an exception discussed below), whether or not Congress chose to
exercise it. The so-called “Dormant” Commerce Clause preempted state
regulation that burdened interstate commerce “directly” or that dealt with a
subject that, by its “general nature, affect[ed] the commercial interests of all
the States.”34 The subject of such regulations, the Court said, was “national”
by “its essential character [and] belong[ed] exclusively to the Federal
government.”35 This category, the Court said, consisted of the regulation “of
commerce with foreign countries or between the States which consists in the
transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.”36 These classes
of regulation, the Court said, “admit and require uniformity.”37 Absent such
preemption, the Court said, “[t]here would . . . be no security against
conflicting regulations of different States, each discriminating in favor of its
own products and citizens, and against the products and citizens of other
States.”38 Of course, the Court’s reference to uniform regulation was not
entirely candid. By definition, the Dormant Commerce Clause only preempts
state regulation when Congress has not acted. Instead of imposing uniform
regulation, then, such preemption merely cleared the way for operation of
the free market supported, of course, by various local forms of police power
regulation and reasonable private contracts overcoming market failure.
State regulation that merely restrained commerce “indirectly” or not at
all generally fell outside congressional power and thus survived Dormant
Commerce Clause review.39 The classic example involved exercises of the
police power, including regulation of cartel pricing or other practices

34. Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148, 152 (1868); see also Cnty. of Mobile v. Kimball,
102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880).
35. Hinson, 75 U.S. at 152 (“[T]here is a class of legislation . . . which, from its essential
character, is National, and which must . . . belong exclusively to the Federal government.”); see also
Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089,
1110–11 (2000) (“The Court consistently maintained that regulations touching a ‘national’
matter or burdening interstate commerce ‘directly’ were unconstitutional.” (citations omitted)).
36. Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876) (holding that state regulation of rates
for storage of grain in elevators did not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause even though most
such grain was intended for export to other states or foreign countries and the regulation “may
indirectly operate upon commerce outside [the state’s] immediate jurisdiction”).
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producing market failures.40 Such regulation, which fit comfortably within the
19th century’s classical, laissez faire economic paradigm, could facilitate or
“aid” interstate commerce.41
The Dormant Commerce Clause did not void every state commercial
regulation falling within Congress’s jurisdiction, however.42 Instead, the Court
recognized that Congress had the authority to regulate some subjects that
were not, by their nature, inherently national and thus did not require
uniform regulation. If, however, Congress declined to act with respect to such
subjects, state regulation governing such subjects nonetheless survived, so
long as such regulation did not burden interstate commerce “directly.” The
result was a category of overlapping jurisdiction in which states could regulate
interstate commerce as an initial matter, unless Congress affirmatively acted
to displace such regulation.43 Examples of subjects states could regulate unless
Congress asserted its authority included inspection and quarantine laws
directed at interstate travel,44 dredging and improvement of harbors,45 and
requirements that vessels entering a harbor after an interstate voyage employ
a local pilot.46 Granting states power over such subjects in the first instance
allowed each jurisdiction to draw on local knowledge and generate
regulations tailored to local conditions.47 Thus, state law provided
background rules supporting interstate commerce, subject to congressional
override.
Three decisions illustrate this dual federalism. The first is Gibbons v.
Ogden. There, the Supreme Court evaluated New York’s conferral of a
monopoly over the operation of steamships in New York waters, including
those arriving from other states, and ultimately held that a federal licensing

40. See id. at 125–34 (sustaining regulation of rates for storage of grain as a valid exercise of
police power).
41. See Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW
1836–1937, at 169–204 (1991); see also infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text (explaining
how, during this era, courts equated police power regulation with the power to combat market
failure); cf. Munn, 94 U.S. at 133–34.
42. See Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1847, 1864 (2007).
43. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851); see also Munn, 94 U.S. at
135 (rejecting Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to price regulation of grain elevators, but
also suggesting that Congress may act “in reference to their inter-state relations”).
44. Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 465–67 (1886).
45. See generally Kimball, 102 U.S. 691.
46. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318.
47. See Morgan’s Steamship Co., 118 U.S. at 465 (“[Q]uarantine laws belong to that class of
state legislation . . . which [is] valid until displaced or contravened by some legislation of
Congress. The matter is one in which the rules that should govern it may in many respects be
different in different localities, and for that reason be better understood and more wisely
established by the local authorities.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203–04 (1824)
(explaining that inspection laws promote interstate commerce and thus do not interfere with
Congress’s commerce power).
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statute preempted the ban.48 The Court also suggested that the dormant
implication of the Commerce Clause preempted such state-conferred
monopolies over interstate commerce, absent congressional legislation.49
More than five decades later, in Kidd v. Pearson, the Court entertained a
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to Iowa’s ban on the manufacture of
alcohol, including alcohol intended for export.50 The Court invoked the
distinction—“popular to the common mind . . . between manufactur[ing] and
commerce”51 holding that the ban, while affecting interstate commerce, did
not burden such commerce “directly.”52 Thus, states possessed exclusive
authority over manufacturing. By contrast, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Illinois, the Court evaluated Illinois’ regulation of the intrastate
component of rates for interstate transportation.53 Invoking Gibbons’
conclusion about the scope of Congress’s power and analogizing rail
transportation to the steamship business over which New York had conferred
monopoly, the Court held that the Commerce Clause preempted such
regulation, even absent congressional action.54 The Constitution, the Court
said, confided such authority in Congress alone, because that body’s
“enlarged view of the interests of all the States, and of the railroads concerned,
better fits it to establish just and equitable rules.”55 Such regulation was thus
“of a general and national character, and cannot be safely and wisely remitted
to local rules and local regulations.”56
The Congress that considered and passed the Sherman Act was aware of
Gibbons, Kidd, and Wabash, and there is no indication that it had a different
conception of the commerce power. Indeed, Congress filled the regulatory
vacuum left by Wabash by passing the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887.57
Moreover, Kidd fueled concerns that Sherman’s initial draft—which banned

48. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 218–22. See generally Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1398 (2004).
49. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 204–09; see also Williams, supra note 48.
50. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 15 (1888).
51. Id. at 20.
52. Id. at 23 (“[L]egislation [by a State] may in a great variety of ways affect commerce and
persons engaged in it, without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the
Constitution, unless, under the guise of police regulations, it imposes a direct burden upon
interstate commerce, or interferes directly with its freedom.” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
53. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886); see also HOVENKAMP,
supra note 41, at 161–63 (discussing Wabash).
54. Wabash, 118 U.S. at 573 (“The argument on this subject[, the reach of Congress’s power,]
can never be better stated than it is by Chief Justice Marshall.” (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195–96)).
55. Id. at 577.
56. Id.; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 159–64 (discussing “extraterritorial effect” of
state rate regulation and resulting “free riding” by states that imposed such regulation).
57. See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); see also WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
120–22 (2010) (reporting that outcry over Wabash led to the Interstate Commerce Act).
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restraints of “production[] or manufacture”—exceeded Congress’s
authority.58 The Senate therefore referred the bill to the Judiciary Committee,
where Senators more conversant with constitutional principles would
radically overhaul Sherman’s initial draft.59 In the final version, the
Committee omitted references to production or manufacture, and banned
instead contracts in “restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States.”60 This final language empowered courts to determine the reach of the
Act, based upon the judiciary’s view of the scope of the commerce power. The
Supreme Court, in turn, would subsequently hold that, when it passed the
Sherman Act, Congress meant to exercise the full extent of its Commerce
Clause power.61 This assumption set the stage for continued expansion of the
Sherman Act as the commerce power expanded over time.
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court invoked its dual federalism
jurisprudence when first interpreting the Sherman Act. In E.C. Knight, for
instance, the Court evaluated a merger that created a monopoly over the
production of sugar in the United States.62 The Court reiterated Kidd and
related decisions holding that states possessed exclusive authority to regulate
manufacturing.63 While control over production influenced commerce and
was necessary to its existence, such control only affected commerce
“incidentally and indirectly.”64 Thus, the Court confirmed that states retained
exclusive authority over manufacturing, mining, and agriculture—including
the authority to impose antitrust regulation or rules of corporate governance

58. See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 1890–1916:
THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS 107 (1988) (reporting the language of Sherman’s original
bill); id. at 113–14 (reporting opposition to Sherman’s bill on Commerce Clause grounds); id. at
113 (noting that Kidd made concerns over the scope of Congress’s authority “particularly salient”);
HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION
171–73 (1995) (reporting 1889 remarks by Senator George invoking Kidd and other Commerce
Clause decisions contending that Sherman’s original bill exceeded the commerce power); id. at 175
(reporting a similar 1890 speech by Senator George).
59. SKLAR, supra note 58, at 114–115.
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see also SKLAR, supra note 58, at 114–17; THORELLI, supra note
58, at 197–99 (concluding that constitutional objections to the bill induced the reference to the
Judiciary Committee).
61. See, e.g., Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976); United
States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
62. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 2–8 (1895).
63. Id. at 13–16; id. at 15–16 (“In Gibbons v Ogden, Brown v Maryland, and other cases often
cited, the state laws, which were held inoperative, were instances of direct interference with, or
regulations of, interstate or international commerce, yet in Kidd v Pearson the [ban on
manufacturing] was held not to directly affect external commerce . . . .”); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S.
517, 525 (1886); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448–49 (1827); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 37–39 (1824).
64. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 12 (“The power to regulate commerce is the power to
prescribe the rule by which commerce shall be governed, and is a power independent of the
power to suppress monopoly.”).
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prohibiting monopolistic transactions.65 “It was in the light of well-settled
principles that the act of July 2, 1890, was framed,” the Court said.66
A few years later, in United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, the Court invoked
categories from its dual federalism jurisprudence to reject the claim that the
Sherman Act banned “ordinary contracts and combinations,” such as the
formation of a partnership in interstate commerce “between two persons
previously engaged in the same line of business,” and thus infringed liberty of
contract.67 While the Act purported to ban all restraints of commerce among
the several states, the Court gave the statute a “reasonable construction.”68
The Court thus held that Congress only meant to ban direct restraints of
interstate commerce, and not those agreements or other practices (like the
formation of a partnership) whose impact on interstate commerce was
“indirect” or “remote.”69
As read by E.C. Knight and Joint Traffic, then, the Sherman Act performed
the same function with respect to direct private restraints that the Dormant
Commerce Clause performed vis-à-vis direct public restraints, namely, it
banned them. The Act also left indirect private restraints unscathed, just as
the Dormant Commerce Clause left indirect public restraints unscathed.
Whether a public or private restraint was “direct” or “indirect” was a question
of substance and not of form, turning upon the Court’s assessment of the
restraint’s impact on interstate commerce. Thus, a private restraint that
replicated a public restraint deemed direct could nonetheless be “indirect” if
its impact on commerce was less pronounced.70

65. See, e.g., Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of
American Corporation Law, 1869–1903, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 304 (1979); see also HOVENKAMP, supra
note 41, at 262–63 (contending that states relied upon the law of trade restraints, not corporate
law, to impose such regulation).
66. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 16.
67. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 566–67 (1898). See generally William
D. Guthrie, Constitutionality of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, as Interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in the Case of the Trans-Missouri Traffic Association, 11 HARV. L. REV. 80 (1897)
(articulating this argument).
68. See Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. at 568 (“[T]he act of Congress must have a reasonable
construction, or else there would scarcely be an agreement or contract among business men that
could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and
possibly to restrain it.” (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898))).
69. Id. at 566 (noting that the Sherman Act does not outlaw “ordinary contracts and
combinations” protected by liberty of contract); see also Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the
Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (1999) (explaining how Joint Traffic’s narrow construction
of the Sherman Act protected agreements sheltered by liberty of contract and saved the statute
from invalidation).
70. See, e.g., Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 587–88, 592–94, 596 (declaring a challenged restraint
indirect even though an analogous restraint imposed by the state legislature would abridge liberty
of contract and restrain interstate commerce directly); id. at 602–03; see also Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 229–30 (1899) (noting that the Commerce Clause
authorizes Congress to regulate some private contracts because “[t]he private contracts may in
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In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, the Court invoked Wabash-like
reasoning and confirmed that states lacked authority to regulate contracts
directly restraining interstate commerce.71 The United States challenged a
multi-state cartel that set prices more than 30% above cost, plus a reasonable
rate of return, for pipe made in one state and sold in another.72 Defendants
contended that the Commerce Clause only empowered Congress to preempt
state-imposed restraints, leaving private restraints to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the states.73
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Commerce Clause
empowered Congress to ban certain private agreements. After all, the Court
said, “private contracts may in truth be as far reaching in their effect upon
interstate commerce as would the legislation of a single state of the same
character.”74 Where that effect was to directly and substantially restrain
interstate commerce, such contracts were “an attempt to regulate a subject
which, for the purpose of regulation, has been, with some exceptions . . .
exclusively granted to Congress . . . .”75 The Commerce Clause empowered
Congress to ban such agreements, just as it empowered Congress to preempt
state enactments that directly restrained interstate commerce.76
The Court also predicted that acceptance of the defendants’ claim that
states possessed exclusive jurisdiction over such agreements would mean that:
“the legislation of the different States might and probably would differ in
regard to the matter, according to what each State might regard as its own
particular interest.”77 Echoing the logic of Wabash, then, the Court opined
that Congress was better positioned than individual states to legislate
regarding agreements directly restraining interstate commerce. In modern
parlance, competition between the states would produce a race to the bottom,
as states that did not internalize the full impact of restraints would pursue
their “interest” by enforcing or at least declining to ban such agreements,
exporting harm to other states.78 Congress, however, was “the proper

truth be as far reaching in their effect upon interstate commerce as would the [state]
legislation . . . of the same character” (emphasis added)).
71. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 232–35.
72. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
73. See generally id. at 278–79.
74. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229–30 (emphases added).
75. Id. at 231 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 229 (“If certain kinds of private contracts do directly, as already stated, limit or
restrain, and hence regulate interstate commerce, why should not the power of Congress reach
those contracts just the same as if the legislation of some state had enacted the provisions
contained in them?”); id. at 231 (“Congress should have jurisdiction as much in the one case as
in the other.”).
77. Id. at 231.
78. See, e.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
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representative of the nation at large,”79 and there was a “great importance of
having but one source for the law which regulates [interstate] commerce
throughout the length and breadth of the land . . . .”80 Presumably Congress
would consider the nation’s welfare when legislating on the subject and thus
produce a uniform rule that reconciled various competing interests.81
The Court hastened to add that Congress lacked authority to regulate
agreements whose impact was felt “wholly within [a state’s] own
borders . . . .”82 The commerce power, the Court said, did not reach
“commerce which is wholly within a State,” with the result that the Sherman
Act did not govern “combinations or agreements so far as they relate to a
restraint of such [intrastate] trade or commerce.”83 Thus, the Court narrowed
the Sixth Circuit’s decree so as not to prevent firms from combining with
respect “to contracts for selling pipe in their own State,” even if a member of
the combination from another state won the contract and made an interstate
sale.84
The Court’s holding that Congress could ban only direct restraints of
interstate commerce replicated the distinction, drawn in Gibbons, between
interstate commerce and commerce internal to one state.85 Moreover, the
Court’s assertion that states lacked the proper incentives to regulate
agreements in the former category followed naturally from the logic of
Wabash. Indeed, the logic predated (barely) the ratification of the
Constitution. At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson
explained the rationale for the scope and limits of Federal Power:
Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and
effects, within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered
as belonging to the government of that state; whatever object of
government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds
of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the
government of the United States.86

79. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 230.
80. Id. at 233.
81. See Wabash, 118 U.S. at 577; see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 345 (1904)
(“No State can, by merely creating a corporation, or in any other mode, project its authority into
other States, and across the continent, so as to prevent Congress from exerting the power it
possesses under the Constitution over interstate and international commerce . . . .”).
82. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 233.
83. Id. at 247.
84. Id. at 247–48.
85. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
86. See The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (Nov. 21, 1787) (statement of James Wilson), reprinted in 2 JONATHAN
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 415, 424 (2d ed. 1996).
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Thus, the impact of some direct restraints fell only upon the citizens of a
single state, such that regulation of such restraints “belong[ed] to the
government of that state.”87 However, the impact of some other direct
restraints fell “beyond the bounds of a particular state” and thus “belong[ed]
to the government of the United States.”88 Indirect restraints, even those of
interstate commerce, also fell outside the scope of Congress’s power,
presumably because the Court believed that states possessed appropriate
incentives to generate optimal rules governing such agreements. Indeed, both
before and after Addyston Pipe, the Court unanimously rejected Sherman Act
challenges to indirect contractual restraints of interstate commerce, leaving
regulation of such agreements to individual states.89 Such regulation,
however, was subject to the strictures of liberty of contract.90
It should be noted that Wilson, Gibbons, Wabash, and Addyston Pipe
articulated a principle, a principle that did not decide concrete cases in the
abstract. Instead, courts were obliged to apply this principle in light of the
facts, including background legal rules, bearing upon the impact of the
regulated conduct. Such facts could change over time, as the national
economy became more integrated, thereby changing the boundaries between
state and federal power.91
To be sure, Addyston Pipe applied a statute exercising Congress’s
commerce power. The Court did not hold that the Dormant Commerce
Clause itself, which preempts state legislation, preempted the private
agreements before the Court. Still, the Court made it plain that the power to
regulate direct private restraints of interstate commerce resided exclusively
with Congress. This was no surprise, given precedent holding that the
interstate “transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities” was
a subject exclusively reserved to Congress.92 Direct private restraints of such
commerce, the Court said, regulated a subject “which, for the purpose of
regulation, has been, with some exceptions . . . exclusively granted to

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179, 184
(1906) (declining to condemn covenant not to compete in the transportation of freight and
passengers along the Ohio River because any impact on interstate commerce was merely
incidental and did not reflect “the dominant purpose of the contract”); Anderson v. United
States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898).
90. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); see also infra notes 109–36 and
accompanying text.
91. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
125, 137–42 (1995) (explaining how increased integration of the national economy naturally
resulted in more expansive congressional authority as more “local” activities produced interstate
impacts); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter
Lessig, Fidelity in Translation].
92. See Cnty. of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880).

A12_MEESE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/18/2015 12:32 PM

ANTITRUST FEDERALISM & STATE RESTRAINTS

2177

Congress.”93 None of the exceptions—for local quarantine laws, pilotage laws,
and the like—applied, however.94 The importance of uniformity in this
context, the Court said, “cannot, in our opinion, be overestimated.”95 Finally,
the Court attributed the absence of state legislation on the subject to a belief
that “it was supposed to be a subject over which state legislatures had no
jurisdiction.”96 In fact, even before Addyston Pipe, at least one federal court
held that state antitrust regulation of interstate commerce contravened the
Dormant Commerce Clause.97 After Addyston Pipe, the Eighth Circuit held that
state antitrust regulation of contracts that directly related to interstate
commerce “imping[ed] upon the exclusive authority of Congress to regulate
commerce among the several states.”98 In support of this holding, the court
cited that portion of the Addyston Pipe opinion that explained why Congress
possessed exclusive regulatory authority over the contracts before the Court.99

93. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231 (1899) (citations
omitted); see also id. at 232 (“The reason why no state legislation upon the subject has been
enacted has probably been because it was supposed to be a subject over which state legislatures
had no jurisdiction.”).
94. The Court cited four cases for the proposition that there were exceptions to Congress’s
exclusive jurisdiction over interstate commerce. Id. at 231 (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. James, 162
U.S. 650, 660–61 (1896); Bowman v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 488 (1888); Morgan’s
S.S. Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 465 (1886); Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697). In Kimball, the
Court held that state legislation to improve Mobile harbor, while falling within the jurisdiction of
Congress, also fell into the category of “subjects local in their nature, or intended as mere aids to
commerce,” and thus did not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause. Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697.
Morgan’s Steamship Co. reached the same conclusion about Louisiana’s system of quarantine laws
that applied to vessels arriving in New Orleans. Morgan’s S.S. Co., 118 U.S. at 465. Bowman
invalidated an Iowa statute prohibiting the importation of “intoxicating liquors.” Bowman, 125
U.S. at 474, 500. Finally, James sustained Georgia’s imposition of liability upon telegraph
companies that failed to employ due diligence to ensure the timely delivery of telegraphed
messages. James, 162 U.S. at 661.
None of these decisions suggested that states possess concurrent jurisdiction to ban or
authorize direct restraints of interstate commerce. In Kimball, for instance, the Court emphasized
Congress’s exclusive power over “all that portion of commerce with foreign countries or between
the States which consists in the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.”
Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697. Regarding such conduct, the Court said, “there can of necessity be only
one system or plan of regulations.” Id. “There would otherwise be no security against conflicting
regulations of different States, each discriminating in favor of its own products and citizens . . . .” Id.
(emphasis added). In such cases, Congress’s “non-action . . . is a declaration of its purpose that
the commerce in that commodity or by that means of transportation shall be free.” Id.
95. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 233.
96. Id. at 232.
97. In re Grice, 79 F. 627, 639 (N.D. Tex. 1897), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Baker v.
Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898).
98. Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F. 242, 244 (8th Cir. 1906)
(citations omitted); see also State v. Fullerton Lumber Co., 152 N.W. 708, 711–12 (S.D. 1915)
(stating that state antitrust law only applied when challenged restraints “affect trade or commerce
wholly within the state”).
99. See Hadley Dean Plate Glass, 143 F. at 244 (citing, among other cases, Addyston Pipe, 175
U.S. at 229–33).
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Several other courts agreed.100 Finally, during the first third of the 20th
century, the Court repeatedly invalidated state price regulation of interstate
commerce under the Dormant Commerce Clause.101
The dual federalism of 1890 plainly prevented Congress from banning
restraints, whether direct or indirect, of intrastate commerce. Moreover, the
same dual federalism prevented states from imposing or banning direct
restraints of interstate commerce.102 What, though, about regulation of
indirect restraints of interstate commerce? If Congress had no authority over
such private restraints in the first place, as the Court held in E.C. Knight and
Joint Traffic, then state regulation could not offend the Dormant Commerce
Clause.103 Moreover, countless decisions affirmed the ability of states to impose
indirect restraints on interstate commerce via police-power regulation.104
Indeed, E.C. Knight expressly stated that regulation of monopolistic control of
100. See Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 376 n.5; James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in
the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law: 1880–1918, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 495, 518 & n.117 (1987) (collecting numerous authorities for the proposition that
“[f]ederal and state jurists often declared that the states could not constitutionally regulate
anticompetitive activity within interstate commerce, and some significant limitations on the scope
of state antitrust provisions were established on this basis” (citation omitted)); see, e.g., State v.
Va.–Carolina Chem. Co., 51 S.E. 455, 461 (S.C. 1905) (“[T]his clause [of the state antitrust
statute] is an attempt by the state to exercise a prerogative of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. No act of Congress has invested the state with authority to interfere with this subject
of commerce.”).
101. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1927)
(invalidating a state regulation of the price of electricity, which regulated party exported to other
states); Missouri ex rel Barrett v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 308–10 (1924) (invalidating
state regulation of the price of natural gas, which regulated parties exported to other states);
Lemke v. Farmers’ Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 61 (1922) (striking down a regulation of the price of
grain, which regulated parties exported to other states).
102. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 797–98 (“The [Parker] Court found that when Congress
passed the Sherman Act in 1890 it never intended the statute to undermine the regulatory power
of state and local governments. But the prevailing view of federal power under the Commerce
Clause in 1890 was that Congress could not have done this even had it wished to. Under that
view, which the Supreme Court confirmed in its . . . E. C. Knight decision, the federal government
had no power to regulate markets that were perceived to be purely intrastate. By the same token,
extraterritorial . . . regulation was unconstitutional. Under this regime of ‘dual federalism,’ any
form of regulation that was within the regulatory power of state and local government[s] was
outside the reach of the federal antitrust laws. Small wonder that the Supreme Court could find
no evidence that the Sherman Act’s framers intended to control state and local regulation.”);
Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 22, at 727 (“In Parker the Court effectively read Wickard
into the legislative history of the antitrust laws and then decided that Congress had not intended
to reach intrastate conduct mandated by the state itself.”).
103. See generally McCurdy, supra note 65, at 304. Indeed, some scholars have pointed out
that federal regulatory efforts were few and far between in the 19th century, with the result that
rejection of such challenges confirmed state regulatory authority and bolstered regulation. See,
e.g., Cushman, supra note 35, at 1121 (“[T]he principal function of locating such activities in the
local sphere and holding that they affected interstate commerce only indirectly was not to
frustrate federal regulation, but instead to insulate state and local regulatory and taxing initiatives
from [D]ormant Commerce Clause attack.” (footnote omitted)).
104. See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text.
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production that “indirectly” affected interstate commerce was a matter of
“internal police.”105 It would thus seem that the dual federalism of the 1890s
left states perfectly free to regulate and even ban indirect restraints of
interstate commerce.106 If so, the 51st Congress may well have anticipated that
states would have the authority to ban perfectly reasonable, wealth-creating
restraints, just as some modern states have attempted to ban, say, minimum
rpm as unlawful per se.107
There is, however, another relevant source of federal law, namely, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both before and after
1890, state courts held that this clause protects economic liberty, including
the liberty to contract, against regulation that exceeded the police power.108
Unlike legislative restraints, private restraints are (generally) voluntary
contracts. In 1887, Supreme Court dicta signaled that regulation of economic
activity had limits.109 Professor Hovenkamp has persuasively argued that the
Court took a Pigouvian approach to defining the scope of the police power,
sustaining only those abridgments of liberty or property that combatted
externalities or other forms of market failure.110 A ban on private “direct
restraints” of intrastate commerce or prohibition of a merger resulting in a
monopoly (an indirect but harmful restraint) would certainly satisfy this
test.111 However, a ban on indirect restraints that produced no harm would
not.112

105. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1895).
106. Id. at 13 (“It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the police
power, and the delimitation between them, however sometimes perplexing, should always be
recognized and observed . . . .”); see also Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 24 (1888).
107. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
108. See Frorer v. People, 31 N.E. 395 (Ill. 1892); People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343 (N.Y. 1888)
(Peckham, J.) (voiding a ban on a retailer’s practice of giving away free products to induce sales);
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886); People v. Marx, 2 N.E. 29 (N.Y. 1885) (voiding a
ban on the sale of oleomargarine); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885) (voiding a ban on cigar
manufacture in tenement houses)(voiding an anti-scrip law as infringing upon the laborer’s right
to contract for satisfactory compensation); DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER:
DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 16–20 (2011) (collecting and
discussing these and other decisions).
109. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“There are, of necessity, limits beyond
which [police power] legislation cannot rightfully go.”).
110. HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 200–01; id. at 201 (stating that the Court only sustained
such regulation when it found “a ‘substantial divergence between the public interest and private
right’—a legal concept similar to Pigou’s ‘divergence between social and private net product’”).
111. See E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 13–14 (finding that regulation of monopolies fell within
the police power); Meese, supra note 69, at 75–80 (discussing decisions sustaining state bans on
horizontal price fixing as police power regulation); cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 131 (1876)
(sustaining regulation of price set by nine firms owning grain elevators that agreed on prices and
published the resulting prices in local newspapers, because “all the elevating facilities [in the
region were] a ‘virtual’ monopoly”).
112. See infra notes 119–23 and accompanying text (recounting holding in Standard Oil and
American Tobacco that ban on harmless restraints would offend liberty of contract).
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Thus, while state regulation of indirect restraints of interstate commerce
could not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause, many such restraints found
protection in liberty of contract. Indeed, in Joint Traffic, the defendants
claimed that the Sherman Act abridged liberty of contract precisely because,
as read in Trans-Missouri Freight, the Act purportedly banned various everyday
contracts and combinations, including covenants ancillary to the sale of a
business, the formation of partnerships, mergers, and covenants ancillary to
the formation of partnerships.113 The Court rejected this claim, holding that
the statute should receive a “reasonable construction” and did not reach these
contracts precisely because they only restrained trade, if at all, indirectly.114
The implication seemed clear: Banning all such contracts, what Peckham
called “ordinary contracts and combinations,” could exceed the police power,
abridging liberty of contract.115 Moreover, because the Fourteenth
Amendment limited all state action, such protection extended to indirect
restraints of intrastate commerce as well.116 Indeed, just two years before
passage of the Sherman Act, Peckham had authored an opinion for the New
York Court of Appeals voiding, as abridging “fundamental and valuable
rights” the state’s effort to criminalize a retailer’s practice of giving away a tea
cup and saucer with the purchase of coffee.117
The Court confirmed this reading of liberty of contract in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, holding that a ban on every contract restraining trade would
destroy contractual liberty and undermine wealth-creating trade.118 Thus, the
Court said, the Sherman Act bans only unreasonable restraints of trade, defined
as agreements that produce monopoly or the consequences of monopoly:
prices, output, or quality departing from the competitive level.119 This Rule of
Reason empowered courts to invalidate both “direct” restraints of interstate
commerce as well as that small subset of “indirect” restraints that produced
harm, e.g., a merger that resulted in a monopoly restraining interstate

113. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 566 (1898); see also United States v.
Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 332–43 (1897).
114. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. at 568.
115. Id. at 566 (referring to such agreements as “ordinary contracts and combinations”); see
also id. at 572 (confirming that the decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), which
held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected liberty of contract, applied equally to the Fifth
Amendment and thus limited the authority of Congress).
116. The practices that Peckham protected in Gillson, for instance, did not affect interstate
commerce, whether directly or indirectly.
117. People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343, 399 (N.Y. 1888) (Peckham, J.).
118. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911); see also Alan J. Meese,
Standard Oil as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 787–90 (2012) (explaining that
Standard Oil read the Sherman Act narrowly so as not to infringe liberty of contract).
119. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60–61; see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition and the
Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 84–89 (describing Standard Oil’s adoption of the Rule of
Reason); id. at 88–89 (recounting decision’s conclusion that only agreements producing higher
prices, reduced output or lower quality are unreasonable).
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commerce.120 Indeed, in American Tobacco, the same Court emphasized that
the statute did not ban “normal and usual contracts essential to individual
freedom.”121 The Court also noted a connection between the protection of
such agreements on the one hand, and robust interstate commerce on the
other. That is, the Court opined that a ban on such agreements, presumably
from any source, would “render difficult if not impossible any movement of
trade in the channels of interstate commerce—the free movement of which it
was the purpose of the statute to protect.”122 In the same way, of course, the
Court had previously opined that state police-power regulation restraining
commerce indirectly overcame externalities and other market failures and thus
aided interstate commerce. In this sense, then, both private and state-imposed
indirect restraints served the same overall economic purpose: overcoming
market failures and improving upon the results that atomistic markets might
produce.123 Taken together, the Fourteenth Amendment and Dormant
Commerce Clause protected one such category (private restraints), while
declining to preempt the other (indirect public restraints). While both types
of restraints were beyond the reach of Congress’s commerce power, both also
helped support and facilitate interstate commerce, thereby ensuring a wellfunctioning national market.
To summarize, Professor Hovenkamp and others correctly conclude that
Congress did not subjectively anticipate Sherman Act preemption of stateimposed restraints. However, as Professor Hovenkamp has explained, this
does not mean that Congress anticipated that states could authorize interstate
cartels or monopolies or ban indirect restraints. On the contrary, a Congress
well attuned to the precedents of the day would have understood that it lacked
authority to preempt state regulation of any restraints, direct or indirect, of
intrastate commerce. Moreover, the same Congress would have understood
that state imposition or regulation of direct restraints of interstate commerce
would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. Finally, Congress would have
understood that judicial protection for liberty of contract by state and federal

120. Meese, supra note 118, at 796–97 (explaining that Standard Oil’s Rule of Reason allowed
courts to reach indirect restraints that produced anticompetitive harm).
121. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180–81 (1911). Standard Oil held that
“the words restraint of trade should be given a meaning which would not destroy the individual
right to contract.” Id. at 180.
122. Id.; see also Whitwell v. Cont’l Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454, 460–61 (8th Cir. 1903) (holding
a ban on liberty to set prices would destroy competition more surely than any private restraint
and that “[t]he exercise of [such] rights is essential to the very existence of free competition” and
thus does not “constitute any . . . restraint upon interstate trade”).
123. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 381–82 (1966) (explaining how restraints ancillary to the formation
of a partnership could prevent market failure that would result from atomistic rivalry between
partners); see also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281–82 (1898) (Taft, J.)
(explaining that the common law “encouraged” such restraints because they induced partners to
focus their efforts on the partnership).
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courts would have significantly limited states’ ability to ban indirect restraints
of interstate or intrastate commerce, thereby leaving parties free to adopt
agreements that facilitated interstate commerce.
In short, as understood during antitrust’s formative era, the Constitution
simply took state regulation of interstate commerce and prohibition of
reasonable restraints of any commerce “off the table.” Sherman Act
preemption of such state regulation would have been redundant, analogous
to (hypothetical) federal legislation banning state statutes impairing the
obligation of contracts involving interstate commerce.124 This constitutional
framework left states free to ban direct restraints of intrastate commerce and
a subset—probably a small subset—of indirect restraints of intrastate and
interstate commerce namely, those that produced harm in the form of higher
prices or lower output.125
Put affirmatively, Congress anticipated that the Sherman Act would ban
private restraints, period, and thus not preempt state legislation that imposed
unreasonable restraints or banned reasonable ones. However, contrary to the
assertions of Parker, its progeny, and many of its proponents, this limitation
on the Sherman Act did not reflect any congressional concern for “state
sovereignty” or “federalism values.” To paraphrase Professor Hovenkamp, any
such congressional concern is entirely fictitious.126 Instead, Congress would
have assumed that, federalism or not, the Constitution ousted states from
adopting such regulations. Modern invocations of federalism and dual
sovereignty are simply ex post rationalizations of judicial refusal to preempt
unreasonable state-imposed restraints.
IV. THE FALL OF DUAL FEDERALISM AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT
The formative era’s constitutional foundations crumbled abruptly during
the 1930s.127 First, the Court famously abandoned numerous decisions
protecting liberty of contract.128 Second, and as famously, the Supreme Court

124. Of course, federal legislation enforcing constitutional provisions is not unheard of. See
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 2002a-1 (2012) (forbidding discrimination “required
by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule or order of a State or any agency or political
subdivision thereof”).
125. In this connection it should be noted that much state regulation that indirectly
restrained interstate commerce, such as the dredging of harbors or the inspection of vessels
screening for diseased passengers, did not burden liberty of contract.
126. HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 797.
127. See Meese, supra note 28, at 296–320 (recounting various Supreme Court decisions
abandoning liberty of contract, removing meaningful limits on Congress’s commerce power, and
weakening Dormant Commerce Clause standards).
128. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (overruling Adkins
v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 533–39 (1934).
Nebbia, it should be noted, rejected the definition of industries “affected with a public interest”
the Court had unanimously adopted just over a decade earlier. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 509–10; see also
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of Kan., 262 U.S. 522, 535–42 (1923).
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removed meaningful limits on Congress’s commerce power, allowing
Congress to regulate what the Court had previously treated as intrastate
commerce.129 No doubt some such expansion was natural and inevitable,
given the integration of the nation’s economy, aided by evolving legal
institutions (such as more flexible incorporation statutes) and technology.
Moreover, evolving technology and legal institutions also created
opportunities for firms, either individually or collectively, to realize
economies of scale that gave rise to barriers to entry, a concept foreign to
many jurists in the 1880s and 1890s.130 These changes rendered it more likely
that “object[s] of government” once deemed purely local could exceed the
bounds of a particular state, with the result that states would exercise exclusive
authority over such objects “in their particular interest,” thereby resulting in
suboptimal legislation.131 If so, fidelity to the principle of political economy
that animated the scope of the commerce power required the Court to
recognize a broader reach of that power.132 In the antitrust context, these
changes could justify application of the Sherman Act to activities, such as
manufacturing, once thought to be within the exclusive control of states,

129. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (stating that commerce power
extends to activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, even if effect is merely
“indirect”); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123–24 (1941) (explaining that Congress may
ban unfair labor practices by firms producing for interstate commerce regardless of volume of
production); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Friedman–Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75
(1937) (sustaining ban on labor practices at a single clothing factory in unconcentrated market);
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–43 (1937).
130. Cf. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1895) (declining to opine on
whether “because others were theoretically left free to go into the business . . . therefore no
objectionable restraint was imposed”); People ex rel. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y.
1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting) (asserting that cartels could not maintain prices above the
competitive level without state aid because such prices would immediately attract new entry). As
Professor Hovenkamp has explained:
Within the classical paradigm, monopoly prices could never be earned in any
industry unless people were artificially restrained from entering. . . . A mere
agreement among sellers to fix prices was of little concern, provided that neither the
price fixers nor the state forbade others from entering the field. If the cartel
members sought to charge monopoly prices, new competition would immediately
frustrate their attempt.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 282–83; see also Meese, supra note 69, at 66-67 (explaining how
Justice Peckham’s Addyston Pipe opinion reflected revised understanding of the possible impact
of private horizontal price fixing).
131. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 229–33 (1899); Wabash,
St Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886); The Debates in the Convention of
the State of Pennsylvania, supra note 86, at 424; see also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at
41–43 (rejecting defendant’s claim that a work stoppage at one of the nation’s largest steel
companies would have only an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce); id. at 41 (stating that
such an effect would be “immediate” and perhaps “catastrophic”).
132. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 91, at 1224–28.
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given the assumption that Congress meant to exercise all of the power it
exercised when it passed the Act.133
However, the post-1937 revolution in Commerce Clause jurisprudence
did more than apply a permanent principle in light of new circumstances.134
Instead, the Court simply declined to place economically sensible limits on
Congress’s power. As a result, the Court repeatedly upheld federal legislation
dealing with purely local matters, in which the object of legislation did not,
even in the modern era, extend beyond any particular state.135 In so doing,
the Court often deferred to congressional determinations that the regulated
activity, when aggregated with other similar activities, had a “substantial
effect” on interstate commerce.136 In the antitrust context, where Congress
had made no such findings, the Court nonetheless extended the Sherman Act
to cover purely local restraints with attenuated connections to interstate
commerce, reasoning that Congress had meant to exercise the full extent of
its commerce authority when it passed the Act.137 If taken to its logical
conclusion, such an approach would confer Sherman Act jurisdiction over any
private restraint, no matter how local, because any such restraint, when
combined with others, would have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.138 Still, the Court has never followed this logic to its ultimate
conclusion, but has instead required a case-by-case assessment to ascertain
some connection between the defendants’ activities (albeit not the restraint
itself) and interstate commerce.139

133. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 259–60 (describing how states lacked appropriate
incentives to develop corporate law preventing anticompetitive mergers).
134. See generally Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 91.
135. See, e.g., NLRB v. Friedman–Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1936)
(sustaining a ban on unfair labor practices at one clothing factory in an unconcentrated market).
136. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
119–20 (1941).
137. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792–93 (1975) (applying the Sherman Act to
price fixing for title searches in one county); Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321–22 (1967)
(applying the Sherman Act to statewide collusion between Oklahoma’s liquor wholesalers). The
“objects” of such regulation were confined to Virginia and Oklahoma, respectively, with the result
that the interests of individual states aligned with the national interest. Therefore, the logic of
Addyston Pipe, Wabash, and Gibbons did not justify federal regulation. See Bruce Johnsen & Moin A.
Yahya, The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 403 (2004) (contending that it is inappropriate to rely upon aggregation test to
establish Sherman Act jurisdiction given absence of congressional findings necessary to justify
such an approach).
138. See generally Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 137, at 444–45 (explaining that Court’s post1937 aggregation test could confer Sherman Act jurisdiction over restraints with a “trivial” impact
if taken to logical conclusion); Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of
Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657, 682 n.113 (1993) (stating that application of
Wickard in the Sherman Act context may result in overlap between state and federal antitrust
regulatory authority).
139. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242–45 (1980)
(finding Sherman Act jurisdiction when the defendants’ activities, and not the restraint itself, had
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Third, and less famously, the Court relaxed Dormant Commerce Clause
limits on state regulation of interstate commerce, “unshackling” states to
regulate commerce that would otherwise have fallen exclusively within
Congress’s now much-expanded jurisdiction.140 The post-1937 Dormant
Commerce Clause test banned only those state enactments that: (1) expressly
discriminated against out-of-state commerce; or (2) while facially neutral,
nonetheless substantially burdened interstate commerce without a rational
basis.141 State statutes that are neutral on their face have almost always survived
such scrutiny.
The decision in Parker, issued in 1943, exemplified such relaxation. It is
well known that the Court rejected a Sherman Act challenge to California’s
coercive reduction in raisin output, 90–95% of which was exported to other
states or foreign countries.142 But the petitioner also claimed that California’s
scheme contravened the Dormant Commerce Clause, a position seconded by
the Solicitor General and famed trustbuster Thurman Arnold, then heading
the Antitrust Division.143 Before 1937, this argument would have failed
because Congress lacked the authority to regulate agriculture.144 However,
the recent vast expansion of congressional authority under the aegis of the
Commerce Clause placed California’s pro-rate scheme squarely within
Congress’s jurisdiction.145 Congressional power over such restraints flowed

a substantial effect on interstate commerce); cf. United States v. Or. State Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S.
326, 338–40 (1952) (finding an agreement between Oregon physicians governing prepaid
medical care did not restrain interstate commerce); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218, 230 (1947) (finding that collusion on taxi fares between Chicago homes and railroad
stations was “too unrelated to interstate commerce to constitute a part thereof within the meaning
of the Sherman Act”).
140. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 483, 521 (1997) (reporting that, in 1938, the New Deal Supreme Court “announced
a radical reconsideration of the Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence” (citing S.C.
State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938))).
141. See United Haulers Ass’n, v. Oneida–Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
338–47 (2007); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970); S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 303
U.S. at 191–96 (sustaining facially neutral regulation of trucks after identifying a rational basis);
Gardbaum, supra note 139, at 521–32 (recounting in detail these doctrinal developments).
142. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
143. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 8, at 53–91; id. at 65 (“A state
legislative program eliminating competition on such a scale is irreconcilable with the very essence
of the Sherman Act, the preservation of commercial competition in interstate industries.”).
144. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68–75 (1936) (voiding agricultural tax as an
attempted regulation of agriculture reserved to the authority of the states under the Tenth
Amendment); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11–18 (1895); Kidd v. Pearson, 128
U.S. 1, 24–26 (1888).
145. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (sustaining regulation of purely local
agriculture). For instance, in United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939), the United States
successfully challenged collusion between dairies in Illinois and neighboring states setting the
price of milk shipped to Chicago. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY 435–36 (1966) (describing this enforcement action). Under Addyston Pipe, the
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naturally from the principles of political economy that informed Gibbons,
Wabash, and Addyston Pipe. Given California’s monopoly on raisins, new entry
could not prevent the restrictions from “directly” restraining interstate
commerce.146 Moreover, as Professor Hovenkamp has explained, the impact
of the state-imposed Parker restrictions “spilled over” to other states, with
consumers in such jurisdictions bearing nearly all the harm flowing from
California’s restraints.147 Thus, such restrictions exemplified a case where a
state enacted legislation that pursued “its own particular interest[,]”148 and
where the resulting legislation “affect[ed] the commercial interests of all the
[s]tates . . . .”149 Thus, despite (overruled) precedents depriving Congress of
authority to regulate agriculture, these new circumstances established that the
“essential character” of legislation coercively setting raisin output below the
competitive level was “[n]ational,” and thus “must . . . belong exclusively to
the Federal government.”150 Nonetheless, the Parker Court ignored numerous
precedents (including Addyston Pipe) that seemed to ban such state price and
output regulation, which restrained interstate commercial activity, and
rejected the plaintiff’s Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.151
V. APPLYING THE SHERMAN ACT TO STATE RESTRAINTS IN A POST-1937
WORLD
Combined with the Court’s refusal to enforce meaningful limits on the
scope of Congress’s commerce power, this unshackling resulted in a vast
increase in the overlap between the power of states and Congress to regulate
commercial activity.152 This overlap, combined with the Court’s expansive
reading of the Sherman Act, raised two interpretive questions courts did not
face before 1937. First, does the Sherman Act preempt unreasonable state
restraints of interstate commerce, such as state legislation setting minimum
prices or maximum output, as in Parker? Second, does the Sherman Act
preempt state bans of otherwise reasonable private conduct that qualifies as
participation of the Illinois defendants was beyond the scope of federal antitrust regulation. See
supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
146. Cf. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 10–11 (declining to opine on whether ease of entry
rendered challenged merger to monopoly innocuous).
147. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 39 (“More than 90 percent of the monopoly
overcharge produced by the prorate program (a mechanism for reducing the supply of raisins)
thus fell on nonresidents of California.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 644–45; Hovenkamp &
Mackerron, supra note 22, at 769.
148. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231 (1899).
149. Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. 148, 152 (1868).
150. Id.; see also Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 234.
151. The Court also ignored various decisions invalidating state price regulation of products
exported to other states. See supra note 101 (collecting such cases); see also Meese, supra note 28,
at 317 n.445 (explaining that decisions Parker invoked in support of its Dormant Commerce
Clause holding were inapposite).
152. See Gardbaum, supra note 140, at 510–32; see also supra notes 42–47 and accompanying
text (discussing examples of overlapping authority pursuant to Cooley and its progeny).
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interstate commerce? The conventional answer, that Congress declined to
impose either form of preemption because of “federalism” and “state
sovereignty,” is simply incorrect, as Professor Hovenkamp has explained.
Congress made no such choice.
Thus, the post-1937 interpretive question for antitrust courts can be
framed as follows: Given the lack of any conscious decision by Congress
regarding the treatment of public restraints, should the Sherman Act
nonetheless preempt such restraints? In my view, the case for such
preemption is much stronger than the Court (and to a lesser extent, Professor
Hovenkamp) has admitted.153 As Standard Oil explained, the Sherman Act
empowers courts to fashion a common law of antitrust in light of evolving
understandings of the impact of various restraints.154 Even Justice Scalia,
known for his formal, textual approach to statutory interpretation, has
assured us that the Sherman Act adopted the common law “along with its
dynamic potential.”155 As Chief Justice White said in Standard Oil, such
flexibility ensured that parties could not evade the “public policy” contained
in the Act by adopting harmful practices unknown at common law or practices
that, while once deemed benign, are now considered harmful.156 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress meant to exercise all of
its constitutional power when it passed the Sherman Act, with the result that
the statute now reaches conduct Congress could not reach in 1890.157 That is
why a merger between manufacturers, what the Court called an “indirect
restraint” in 1895, can now give rise to a federal case, even if the merger
achieves far less than a monopoly.158 Technology and legal institutions have
changed, empowering firms to employ such transactions to control markets
and directly restrain interstate commerce. Finally, the Court has told us that
the Sherman Act is a “charter of freedom,” indeed, “the Magna Carta of free
enterprise.”159 No doubt focus on economic liberty has sometimes led the
Court astray, as when the Court found that voluntary private restraints that
153. So far as I know, no Justice has ever voted to overrule Parker, which itself was unanimous.
154. Meese, supra note 119, at 89–92.
155. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (“The Sherman
Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common
law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in
1890.” (citations omitted)); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 69 (“One of the great myths
about American antitrust policy is that courts first began to adopt an ‘economic approach’ to
antitrust problems in the relatively recent past. . . . [However,] [a]ntitrust has always been closely
tied to prevailing economic doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).
156. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–61 (1911).
157. See supra notes 61 & 137 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz & Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(sustaining FTC’s challenge to transaction that produced firm with less than 35% of the market).
159. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); see also Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978) (referring to the Sherman Act as a “charter of
economic liberty” (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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create wealth abridged the liberty of the parties who entered them and
defended them vigorously in court.160 Still, even Justices protective of
economic liberty during the Lochner era recognized that the Sherman Act
protected private firms and individuals from certain contracts and thus
protected “the freedom of trade” from private restraints.161 This “super
statute” implements the nation’s fundamental commitment that “competition
rule[s] the marts of trade,”162 and it is not repealed lightly, expressly or
implicitly.163
State-imposed direct restraints of interstate commerce were unlawful and
thus unknown in that sense when Congress passed the Sherman Act. They
also produce the very same harms—sometimes greater harms—than private
restraints. The Parker restraints reduced output and increased prices and thus
produced more harm than many unlawful private restraints, some of which
courts condemn regardless of harm.164 The scheme also restrained the actual
liberty of the state’s raisin growers, unlike the typical private cartel, as
membership in the latter is purely voluntary.
In short, state restraints, backed by the threat of jail, fine, or both, do
more violence to economic liberty than most, if not all, private restraints. They
can also produce more economic harm than many private restraints the
Sherman Act condemns. If the Sherman Act reflects a national policy favoring
“free competition,” economic liberty and the resulting allocation of resources,
state restraints that export harm to other states thwart that policy every bit as
much as, say, an exemption from the Act at the behest of special interests,
something courts are loathe to find.165 If Congress really did mean the scope
of the Sherman Act to expand over time to reach restraints that were

160. Topco, of course, exemplified this sort of error. See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust, Regulatory
Harm and Economic Liberty, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 115, 121–22 (2014).
161. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“The purpose of the
Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, contracts and combinations which probably would
unduly interfere with the free exercise of the rights by those engaged, or who wish to engage, in
trade and commerce—in a word to preserve the right of freedom to trade.”); Standard Oil, 221
U.S. at 55–56 (explaining that English common law declined to enforce unreasonable restraints
in part because of their impact on “the rights of individuals”).
162. Times–Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); see also William
N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1231–37 (2001) (discussing
the Sherman Act’s status as a “super statute” of quasi-constitutional dimensions).
163. See Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979) (emphasizing
that courts construe implicit and explicit exemptions from the Sherman Act narrowly).
164. Naked horizontal price fixing, for instance, is unlawful per se regardless of the market
position of the parties. Moreover, many ties deemed unlawful per se may actually produce net
economic benefits. See Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the
Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 61–66 (1997).
165. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir.
1992) (stating that “courts read [special interest] exceptions to the antitrust laws narrowly, with
beady eyes and green eyeshades” (citing, e.g., Grp. Life & Health Ins., 440 U.S. at 231; Nat’l
Broilier Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827–29 (1978))).
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unknown or beyond its authority in 1890, then surely the Act must preempt
state restraints, now that legal developments, some external to the Act, make
such preemption possible.166 That, at least, is what the Roosevelt
Administration, including Thurman Arnold, thought in 1943.167
Considerations of federalism do not necessarily point in the other
direction. The same Court that invokes federalism in support of Parker has
expanded the Sherman Act to reach conduct that is far more “local” than
California’s raisin cartel.168 Any coherent “federalism” or “state sovereignty”
that justifies Parker, ARC America, and Exxon includes more than the license to
coerce market actors to reduce output or increase prices. Properly
understood, such federalism also includes the ability not to pass an antitrust
statute in the first place, or to pass one that allows defendants to assert a
reasonable price defense, for instance.169 Yet, the same jurisprudence that
allows states to impose cartels on multi-million dollar industries exporting
their (diminished) output to other states also bans purely local price fixing by
private parties with no interstate effect, regardless of the antitrust policy of
the state in question. Instead of privileging “federalism,” then, decisions such
as Parker, Exxon, and ARC America privilege “regulation” over liberty and
efficiency.170 A mere preference for more regulation does not rebut the legal
case for preemption sketched above.
There are, of course, arguments militating against such preemption. The
persuasiveness of these contentions will turn on the reader’s approach to
reading statutes and reaction to the current scope of the Sherman Act vis-àvis purely local conduct. As an initial matter, the Sherman Act penalizes
“persons” who enter “contracts,” “combinations,” or “conspiracies,” or who
“monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “conspire to monopolize.”171
States are not “persons” who can “monopolize,” and a statute authorizing a
state agency to restrict output is certainly not an “agreement,” even if
166. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 91, 1214–33 (explaining how change in legal
presuppositions can justify changed application of an otherwise unchanged provision).
167. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 8, at 61–62 (noting Congress
plainly had the authority “to supersede all state legislation in a field it intends to occupy” and had
“‘exercised all the power it possessed’” when passing the Sherman Act (quoting Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1941))); id. at 65 (“A state legislative program eliminating
competition on such a scale is irreconcilable with the very essence of the Sherman Act, the
preservation of commercial competition in interstate industries.”); id. at 66 (“The Sherman Act
may thus be regarded as a [c]ongressional affirmation of the constitutional doctrine that national
interstate commercial interests are not to be subjected to restrictive state legislation.”).
168. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792–93 (1975) (applying Sherman Act to
price fixing for title searches in one county).
169. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 30, 40 (contending that Parker’s respect for federalism
is selective at best).
170. Exxon’s expressed fear that Sherman Act preemption would prevent states from
imposing unreasonable and wealth-destroying “economic regulation” exemplifies the proregulation bias of the Court’s antitrust federalism jurisprudence.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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incumbent producers advocate and welcome the measure.172 True, such
measures can produce the same (or worse) effects as private restraints, but
then so can sabotage or slander, neither of which are ipso facto antitrust
violations.173 Congress does not pass “purposes,” but instead enacts statutory
language—language that signals the means Congress chose to further its
purpose as well as those means it rejected. Pursuit of such purpose “at all
costs” can thus thwart, not execute, Congress’s intent.174
Moreover, given the Sherman Act’s current application to conduct with
no meaningful interstate impact, antitrust preemption of state interference
with free competition would result in (federal) judicial supervision of purely
local regulations. Zoning ordinances, taxicab regulation, occupational
licensing—all could give rise to antitrust regulation assessing, say, the
reasonableness of a municipality’s decision, fully authorized by the state, to
suppress billboards (and thus advertising) so as to maintain a bucolic
atmosphere and attract tourists.175 Classical liberals like this author might
applaud the results of such litigation—more economic liberty and more
wealth. But devotees of an original meaning approach to constitutional
interpretation—again like this author—would not applaud the
overexpansion of federal power necessary to achieve them.176
There is, I believe, a way out of this thicket. In particular, the following
solution would: (1) void restraints such as those sustained in Parker; (2) avoid
Sherman Act preemption of state restraints; and (3) minimize the sort of
federal-state tension that Parker’s proponents invoke as a rationale for
adhering to the decision.
First, the Court should restrict the scope of the Sherman Act so as to
implement the principle that Congress embraced in 1890, applied in light of
172. See generally Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)
(emphasizing that section 1 of the Sherman Act only reaches concerted action between otherwise
independent economic entities).
173. Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945) (“[The Sherman] Act does not purport
to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in interstate
commerce.”).
174. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (“[N]o legislation pursues its
purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the
achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates
rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s
primary objective must be the law.”); see also United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297 (1970) (A
statute “is not an empty vessel into which this Court is free to pour a vintage that we think better
suits present-day tastes”).
175. Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 368 (1991); cf. Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1977) (relying on Parker to reject Sherman Act challenge to state’s
ban on lawyer advertising); Hovenkamp & Mackerrron, supra note 22, at 746–47 (cataloguing
various forms of local economic regulation that have given rise to federal antitrust suits).
176. See Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 343 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(decrying expansive reading of the Sherman Act that made “routine business torts” the basis for
Sherman Act claims thus “destroying a sensible statutory allocation of federal-state responsibility
and contributing to the trivialization of the federal courts”).
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modern economic and legal conditions, governing the (limited) scope of the
commerce power. Thus, the Court should ban only those practices that
actually restrain interstate commerce and thus impose distinct harm on
consumers in more than one state.177 Such an approach would limit Sherman
Act jurisdiction to those instances in which the “object of government
extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state,”
with the result that states cannot be trusted to generate optimal rules
governing such conduct.178 While the Act should reach cartels and
monopolies that export their products to other states (like the Sugar Trust
exonerated in E.C. Knight), it should not reach price fixing by lawyers in a
single county, bans on lawyer advertising in a single state, or the exclusion of
a single physician from a single department of a single hospital.179 Instead,
individual states, which internalize the full impact of such restraints will thus,
in competition with one another, generate optimal rules governing such
conduct.180 While antitrust purists may not endorse the results that each
jurisdiction might produce, true federalism requires its proponents to take
the bitter with the sweet.
Limiting the scope of the Sherman Act along the lines just suggested
would, despite the post-1937 unshackling of the states, eliminate most of the
tension between federal antitrust law, on the one hand, and state and local
regulation on the other.181 Downsizing the scope of the Act in this manner
would also deflate much of the “federalism” concerns that drive support for

177. See Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 137 (advocating restriction of Sherman Act jurisdiction to
those restraints that impact a geographic market that extends beyond a single state); see also
Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 41 (contending that such a limitation on the scope of the Sherman Act
would reduce the tension between state regulation and the Sherman Act); cf. McLain v. Real Estate
Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242–46 (1980) (finding Sherman Act jurisdiction when the
defendants’ activities, and not the restraint itself, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
178. See The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, supra note 86, at 424;
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228 (1889); Wabash, St. Louis & Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 574 (1886); see also Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 137 (resting
such an approach upon considerations of “competitive federalism”).
179. See generally Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 137. It should not matter in cases such as Goldfarb
that individuals who had not yet moved into the state were the nominal purchasers of the cartelized
services. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 48 (“The cost of attorneys’ services [i.e., the cost of title
searches in Goldfarb] is simply one component of the price of buying a new house. Real estate and
attorneys’ time are complementary inputs into housing. If the minimum fee schedules caused the
price of attorneys’ time to rise, they also caused the price of real estate to fall. The overcharge
ultimately was paid by the Virginia residents who attempted to sell real estate.”).
180. Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 41 (limiting the scope of the Sherman Act to what
Congress originally contemplated “would obviate most of the need for accommodation and,
incidentally, produce the sort of inter-jurisdictional competition I discuss in this essay”); Johnsen
& Yahya, supra note 137, at 458 (advocating reduced scope for Sherman Act jurisdiction so as to
facilitate competition between states generating statewide antitrust policies).
181. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 41 (“The need for accommodation between state and
federal law arises only because the Sherman Act has grown with the growth of the commerce
power.” (citations omitted)).
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Parker. Zoning, lawyer advertising, and regulation of trash collection would all
reside beyond the scope of section 1, and the title-search lawyers of Fairfax
County could fix fees until their hearts content so far as the Sherman Act is
concerned.182 In the same way, North Carolina dentists could induce state
regulators to exclude non-dentists from the purely local practice of teeth
whitening.183 Thus, instead of defending the regulation of billboards or
garbage collection from federal intrusion, opponents of preemption would
have to defend state raisin cartels and per se bans on reasonable interstate
resale price maintenance.184
Second, the Court could, at least for now, reiterate that the Sherman Act
does not, of its own force, preempt state-imposed restraints. The contrary
conclusion, while friendly to liberty, might stretch the meaning of “person,”
“contract,” and “monopolize” too far, ascribing to Congress an important
choice that body never made. In any event, as we shall see in a moment, there
is an alternate means of achieving the same result that does not require courts
to stretch the statute’s original meaning.
Third and finally, the Court could take up and consider Professor
Hovenkamp’s suggestion that the Dormant Commerce Clause interdict those
restraints that impose significant spillovers on consumers in other states.185 To
do so, of course, the Court would have to reconsider Parker’s less famous
holding that a pro-rate scheme that visits nearly all of its costs on consumers
in other states is nonetheless consistent with the Dormant Commerce Clause
because growers sold to intermediaries and some local consumers purchased
raisins as well.186
One hopes that the Court reconsidering Parker’s Dormant Commerce
Clause holding would begin (and hopefully end) with Gibbons, Wabash, and
Addyston Pipe. The Gibbons decision opined—to be fair, did not hold—that
New York’s imposition of monopoly over steam navigation in its home waters
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause to the extent that the monopoly
excluded other steamship owners from carrying passengers and goods
between New York and other states. It did not seem to matter to the Gibbons
court that the monopoly also excluded New Yorkers from intrastate steamship

182. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788–93 (1975) (banning agreement on the
price for title searches by lawyers in Fairfax County, Virginia).
183. See generally Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 137.
184. Cf. Dr. Miles v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (finding that nationwide
minimum rpm scheme directly restrained interstate trade and thus fell within jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act).
185. See Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 646 (opining that the Dormant Commerce Clause can
police “egregious situations in which the impact of state regulation falls almost entirely on outof-state interests”). Unlike Professor Hovenkamp, I would not limit Dormant Commerce Clause
intervention to “egregious” situations but instead to situations in which spillovers are substantial
or significant.
186. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 360, 367 (1943) (emphasizing that California’s
scheme did not “discriminate” against interstate commerce).
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travel in New York waters or that some victims of the monopoly were almost
certainly New Yorkers who wanted to travel to New Jersey almost as badly as
New Jersey residents wanted to travel to New York. In other words, the Gibbons
monopoly was entirely neutral and did not “discriminate” in the least against
citizens from other states. Nonetheless, the Great Chief Justice apparently
believed that the resulting exclusion of some vessels from interstate
commerce was unconstitutional, regardless whether Congress acted.187
Moreover, taken together, Wabash and Addyston Pipe establish that regulations
of commerce whose effects spill over from one state to another are best left—
in fact, must be left—to the national government or, failing congressional
action, the market itself.188 Indeed, just five years before Parker, the Court
conceded “that there is scope for [the Dormant Commerce Clause’s] like
operation when state legislation nominally of local concern is in point of fact
aimed at interstate commerce, or by its necessary operation is a means of
gaining a local benefit by throwing the attendant burdens on those without
the state.”189 California’s pro-rate scheme did exactly that, conferring benefits
on California farmers at the expense of citizens in other states, and the Court
should overrule Parker’s Dormant Commerce Clause holding accordingly.190
There is an additional reason to abandon Parker’s shelter for stateimposed cartels. Thus far I have applied the Wabash and Addyston Pipe
standard for allocating governmental authority from a “microeconomic”
perspective, asking which jurisdiction—federal or state—is better positioned
to generate (and decline to generate) rules that lead to an efficient allocation
of resources. But we now know something the Wabash and Addyston Pipe Courts
did not know, namely, that restrictions on price and output can have
(negative) macroeconomic effects as well. In particular, price floors and
output ceilings thwart the process of natural economic adjustment that can
moderate downturns and speed economic recovery.191 According to some,

187. It should also be noted that the monopoly grant excluded New York entrepreneurs as
well as those from New Jersey and was thus neutral in this sense as well. One could, however,
argue that the Gibbons monopoly was discriminatory because the New York legislature would not
have made such an award to a non-New York resident. However, the Court’s assertion that the
monopoly violated the Dormant Commerce Clause does not seem to turn on the residence of
the monopoly’s recipient.
188. See supra notes 53–56, 72–85, 92–101 and accompanying text.
189. S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1938) (citations omitted).
190. If Congress believes that state-by-state cartelization of such industries is advisable, it can
affirmatively authorize such cartelization by statute. Indeed, Parker relied in part upon the fact that
Congress had itself authorized similar programs for various agricultural products. Parker, 317 U.S.
at 367–68. However, the decision’s Dormant Commerce Clause holding has apparently not been
limited to instances in which Congress has implicitly approved the challenged state restraint.
191. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 271–76 (7th ed. 2010); F.M. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 363–65 (2d ed. 1980); Christina D.
Romer, The Nation in Depression, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 25 (1993) (“In the conventional textbook
model a fall in wages and prices raises real balances, lowers interest rates, and thus stimulates
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inflexible prices can also reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy as an
anti-recessionary policy instrument.192 Thus, aggressive antitrust policy and
other policies that assure free competition can do more than ensure an
efficient allocation of society’s resources and thus maximize wealth. Such
policies can also help stabilize the macro-economy. No state internalizes the
full impact of its economic policies upon the state of (national) aggregate
demand and supply.
Nothing, it seems, is more “inherently national” than macroeconomic
stabilization policy.193 The Parker Court wrote in an era in which many
believed that state-enforced cartelization would bolster, not hamper,
economic recovery.194 Modern economic science reaches the opposite
conclusion, teaching that such restraints hamper recovery. Just three years
after Parker, Congress committed the national government to the promotion
of “free competitive enterprise” as part of a larger agenda of price stability
and full employment.195 Both developments bolster the case for overruling
Parker and its progeny.
The approach just sketched would largely, but not entirely, replicate the
institutional framework that Congress believed it was supporting when it
passed the Sherman Act in 1890. The Sherman Act (and only the Sherman
Act) would reach those restraints that produce meaningful interstate
spillovers. States would be free to regulate (or not) restraints of intra-state
commerce but not entitled to impose direct restraints on interstate
commerce. The ratio between the federal and state regulatory domains would
be larger than in 1890, given the changed nature of American industry and
the background rules (e.g., corporate law) that support it. Still, the division
of regulatory authority and resulting (modern) dual federalism would
implement the (immutable) principle of political economy that animated the
formative era’s dual federalism.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Sherman Act does not
preempt state-imposed restraints of interstate commerce, even when such
restraints visit substantial harm on consumers in other states. Like several
scholars, the Court has invoked considerations of “federalism” and “state
sovereignty” to justify this narrow reading of the Act. Thus, the Court has

investment. The rise in investment serves to counteract at least some of the fall in demand.”). See
generally A.C. Pigou, The Classical Stationary State, 53 ECON. J. 343 (1943) (elaborating this argument).
192. See Henry C. Simons, Economic Stability and Antitrust Policy, 11 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 343 (1944).
193. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (preventing states from coining money, emitting letters
of credit or making anything other than gold or silver coin legal tender for the payment of debts).
194. See Meese, supra note 28, at 312–15.
195. See Employment Act of 1946, ch. 33, 60 Stat. 23, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021–1026 (2012)
(committing national government to “promote free competitive enterprise” and full
employment, full production, and price stability).
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imputed to the 1890 Congress a decision to allow individual states to impose
restraints that do greater harm to the nation’s economic welfare than many
analogous private restraints that squarely violate the Act.
As Professor Hovenkamp has shown, any such congressional intent is
entirely fictitious. In 1890, the Supreme Court enforced a constitutional
regime of dual federalism, under which state and national regulatory
authority was for all relevant purposes mutually exclusive. For instance, the
Court enforced meaningful limits on Congress’s commerce power, leaving
states with exclusive authority over purely intrastate commerce. At the same
time, the Court held that the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause prevented
states from enacting laws that imposed direct restraints on interstate
commerce. Such dual federalism and the resulting boundaries between state
and federal power reflected a basic principle of political economy, namely,
that states should possess exclusive jurisdiction over conduct that did not
impact other states, while Congress should retain sole authority over that
conduct which affected more than one state. Thus, the 1890 Congress had no
reason to consider whether the Sherman Act would ban unreasonable stateimposed restraints of interstate commerce. Moreover, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented states from imposing unreasonable
restraints of intrastate commerce.
The constitutional framework in place in 1890 collapsed in the late
1930s, creating a regime of overlapping state and federal powers in which
states are free to impose wealth-destroying restraints of interstate commerce,
so long as such restraints do not expressly discriminate against interstate
commerce. These fundamental changes in the constitutional landscape force
courts to consider whether the Sherman Act preempts state-imposed
restraints that produce the same economic harm as private restrains that
violate the Act. This Essay contends that the case for such preemption is
stronger than many have recognized, given the long-recognized authority of
courts to alter the scope of the Sherman Act in response to changed
circumstances. At the same time, the Essay proposes an approach that is less
radical than Sherman Act preemption of all state-imposed restraints currently
within Congress’s jurisdiction. Instead, the Essay proposes that the Court
restrict the scope of the Sherman Act so that the statute reaches only that
conduct which produces harm in more than one state. Such an approach
would restore the original federal–state balance where antitrust regulation is
concerned and eliminate many potential conflicts between the Sherman Act
and purely local regulation. At the same time, the Court should revitalize
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence so as to invalidate those stateimposed restraints that impose significant harm on consumers in other states.
Like the proposed reduction in the scope of the Sherman Act, such
revitalization will help restore the allocation of regulatory authority extant
when Congress passed the Sherman Act.

